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Abstract We consider the problem of fairly dividing l divisible goods among
n agents with the generalized Leontief preferences. We propose and characterize
the class of generalized egalitarian rules which satisfy efficiency, group strategy-
proofness, anonymity, resource monotonicity, population monotonicity, envy-freeness
and consistency. On the Leontief domain, our rules generalize the egalitarian-
equivalent rules with reference bundles. We also extend our rules to agent-specific
and endowment-specific egalitarian rules. The former is a larger class of rules satis-
fying all the previous properties except anonymity and envy-freeness. The latter is
a class of efficient, group strategy-proof, anonymous and individually rational rules
when the resources are assumed to be privately owned.
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1 Introduction
In the fair division literature, efficiency and strategy-proofness typically imply totally
unfair outcomes. For example, Zhou (1991) shows that an efficient and strategy-proof
allocation rule must be dictatorial already in a two-agent economy with continu-
ous, strictly monotonic and strictly convex preferences. Such negative result has been
extended to several more restricted domains by many researchers. Serizawa and Wey-
mark (2003) further shows that in a many-agent many-good economy, no efficient and
strategy-proof rule can guarantee every agent a consumption bundle bounded away
from the origin. (Additional discussion of related literature is given at the end of this
section.)
However, the picture changes a lot if we assume full complementarity among the
goods and consider the domain of Leontief preferences. On the Leontief domain,
for most efficient divisions of a given set of resources, some of the resources are
redundant.1 Thus, it makes sense to give the agents only the least amount of goods
to achieve given welfare levels, while transferring the redundant resources to other
potential users outside the rule.2 We speak in this case of a non-wasteful rule. In
addition to the normative concern of parsimony, the restriction to non-wasteful rules
reduces the possibility of strategic manipulation. It turns out that then there exist rules
satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness and many fairness axioms.
The Leontief preferences and the corresponding non-wasteful rules are of
natural practical interests, as shown in the computer science literature like Ghodsi
et al. (2010), Hindman et al. (2011), Bodwin et al. (2011), Joe-Wong et al. (2011),
Dolev et al. (2012), etc. For example, they consider multiple resource sharing prob-
lems in cloud computing systems. The users are allocated with computing resources
like CPU, memory and I/O resources to do their different jobs with heterogeneous
demands. In such circumstance, each user needs the resources in a customized
proportion while redundant resources should not be allocated in order to avoid
waste.
Two earlier papers inspire our work. Ghodsi et al. (2010) are the first to propose non-
wasteful rules for the Leontief domain. They prove that in a many-agent many-good
economy, the egalitarian-equivalent (EE) rule proposed by Pazner and Schmeidler
(1978) (they call it the Dominant Resource Fairness mechanism) is efficient, strategy-
proof and envy-free, and satisfies several other fairness axioms. Prior to them, Nicolò
(2004) characterizes in a two-agent two-good economy with generalized Leontief pref-
erences, a class of rules which are efficient, fully implementable in truthful strategies
(a requirement stronger than strategy-proofness) and individually rational. However,
Nicolò’s rules are wasteful, and he finds it difficult to generalize his result to an econ-
omy with more agents and more goods.
1 For example, in a two-agent two-good economy, both agents have the same preference represented by
the utility function u(x) = min{ x12 , x2}, and the endowment vector is (2, 2). Then, 1 unit of good 2 is
redundant in any efficient allocation which divides up all the resources.
2 Notice that here withholding the redundant resources does not affect efficiency since they are useless to
the agents. It is different from the budget loss in VCG mechanisms which directly reduce the welfare of the
agents.
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Our contribution is to bring the existing results to a much more general level. Under
Leontief preferences, we propose a class of non-wasteful rules which generalize the
EE rules with reference bundles (see Sect. 3 for the relation of the EE rule and those
with reference bundles). They satisfy efficiency, (group) strategy-proofness and almost
all the fairness axioms in the literature (see below for further discussion). We also
characterize our rules by these axioms. Moreover, the characterization works as well
on a much larger preference domain—the generalized Leontief preference domain,
which we shall discuss later. Lastly, we provide two natural extensions of our rules.
The rules we propose are called generalized egalitarian rules (defined in Sect. 3). A
generalized egalitarian rule assumes that there is a continuous monotonic “benchmark
preference” in the commodity space owned by the society. It looks for the non-wasteful
efficient allocation where all the agents get the bundles among which the society is
indifferent according to its benchmark preference. In another way, we can visual-
ize that in the commodity space, the agents walk on their own “minimum-demand”
paths associated with their Leontief preferences at some given speeds which guaran-
tee that at any time they all simultaneously stand on the same indifference curve of
the benchmark preference, and then our rule picks the end points where they reach
the endowment feasibility constraints. Essentially, egalitarian rules set a standard for
society to measure different ordinal preferences of the agents so that they are treated
equally by this standard. While a classical EE rule makes the agents feel indifferent
between their allocations and the same fraction of the social endowment, our rule gives
the agents “equal” bundles according to a utility function of the society. It turns out
that when the social endowment is fixed, a classic EE rule on the Leontief domain is
one of our rules with a particular benchmark preference. We discuss about it in detail
in Example 2 of Sect. 3.
There is another interpretation of generalized egalitarian rules. Thomson (1994)
proposes a concept of equity to capture the notion of equal opportunities. Given a
family C of choice sets, he defines an equal opportunity allocation relative to C as one
giving every agent his optimal bundle from a common choice set in C. Since such an
allocation is obtained by having the agents choose in a common choice set, they can
be viewed to get equal opportunities. It turns out that a general egalitarian rule always
picks the Pareto-optimal equal opportunity allocation relative to a corresponding fam-
ily of nested choice sets.
Our first main result (Theorem 1) shows that a generalized egalitarian rule satis-
fies efficiency, group strategy-proofness, anonymity, resource monotonicity, popula-
tion monotonicity, envy-freeness and consistency; and conversely, given an efficient,
resource monotonic and consistent rule, if it is either strategy-proof and anonymous,
or envy-free, then it must be a generalized egalitarian rule.
All these axioms are very familiar in the fair division literature. Among the incen-
tive compatibility axioms, group strategy-proofness is a very strong one. It allows no
group of agents to misreport their preferences together and achieve Pareto improve-
ment within the group (see Pattanaik 1978; Barberà 1979; Moulin and Shenker 2001;
Serizawa 2006; Juarez 2008). For the fairness axioms, anonymity simply rules out the
discrimination of the agents by their names; resource monotonicity guarantees that
every agent benefits from the growth of the social endowment (see Roemer 1986a,b;
Chun and Thomson 1988); population monotonicity ensures that no agent will get
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worse off when less agents join in the division (see Thomson 1983); and envy-freeness
makes every agent weakly prefer his own allocation to anybody else’s (see Foley 1967;
Varian 1974, 1976). The consistency axiom has also played an important role in the fair
division literature, in particular, the rationing (or bankruptcy) problems (see Aumann
and Maschler 1985; Young 1987; Thomson 1988). It requires that when some agents
leave first with their allocated bundles, if we apply the rule again to the reduced econ-
omy, the rest of the agents will still be allocated with the same bundles as in the original
economy. For a survey of these and some other axioms in the fair division literature,
see Thomson (2010).
Many of the axioms above are known to be very demanding and typically incompat-
ible. For example, Moulin and Thomson (1988) show that any efficient and resource
monotonic rule must generate envy in an economy with continuous, monotonic, con-
vex and homothetic preferences. However, generalized egalitarian rules under Leontief
preferences surprisingly satisfy them all.
Our rules and characterization apply for a much larger preference domain—the
domain of generalized Leontief preferences (see Theorem 2). While for a standard
Leontief preference, the set of minimum commodity bundles that achieve given utility
levels, which we called the critical set, is a ray from the origin in the commodity
space, the critical set of a generalized Leontief preference can be an arbitrary strictly
increasing curve starting from the origin. In real life, generalized Leontief preferences
are relevant when the agents are production units and the goods are inputs. For example,
a group of people are dividing some cotton, silk and lace to make clothes. They would
like to use these materials in different proportions according to their own tastes. Given
the precise combination of the materials to make some pieces of clothes, more material
of one kind is useless, which captures the essence of a Leontief preference. Moreover,
when the amount of all materials increases, one might be able to make a dress instead of
a shirt which requires different proportion of materials. There might also exist different
types of returns to scale which alter the input proportion. Hence, one’s critical set is
an increasing curve, as exhibited in the generalized Leontief preferences.
Our results crucially depend on the restriction to non-wasteful rules. We give an
example in Sect. 3 showing that our results do not hold without this restriction. Our
characterization is tight with respect to all the axioms.
Our next two results (Theorems 3, 4) extend the generalized egalitarian rules in
two directions. First, instead of using one single benchmark preference to measure all
agents’ utilities, a rule may assign to each agent a personal welfare index and equalize
their utilities according to these agent-specific welfare indices. This family of rules is
a much larger and non-anonymous class. Naturally, we do not expect envy-freeness
in this case. However, all the other good properties are preserved.
The second extension is motivated when the resources are assumed to be privately,
rather than commonly, owned by the agents. A compelling requirement here is the
voluntary participation of the agents in the social reallocation. This is ensured by the
individual rationality axiom, which requires the allocation to an agent to be no worse
(for this agent) than his initial endowment. In this case, we can set the welfare indices
such that it is always an “equal treatment” allocation to give every agent the minimum
bundle that provides him the same welfare level as his private endowment. The welfare
indices then depend on the endowment profile. By slightly modifying the argument
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in Moulin and Thomson (1988), one can check that efficiency, resource monotonicity
and individual rationality are also incompatible in our context. We show that our
endowment-specific egalitarian rules are efficient, group strategy-proof, anonymous,
consistent and individually rational.
For both agent-specific and endowment-specific rules, our results are one-sided and
we leave the characterizations as open questions.
After the literature review below, the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents the basic model and the axioms. Section 3 defines the generalized egalitar-
ian rules under Leontief preferences and gives the characterization result. Section 4
introduces the generalized Leontief preference domain, on which the characterization
still holds. Section 5 contains the main proofs. Section 6 checks the tightness of our
characterization. Sections 7 and 8 provide two extensions of the generalized egalitar-
ian rules: agent-specific and endowment-specific egalitarian rules. Section 9 provides
concluding remarks. The “Appendix” contains some supporting proofs.
Related literature
For the incompatibility of efficiency and strategy-proofness with fairness prop-
erties in exchange economies, Hurwicz (1972) first proves that any efficient and
individually rational rule is manipulable in two-agent two-good economies where
both agents have continuous, strictly convex and strictly monotonic preferences.
Dasgupta et al. (1979) replace individual rationality with non-dictatorship, while
allowing discontinuous preferences. Zhou (1991) shows that in two-agent many-
good exchange economies with the same preference domain as in Hurwicz (1972),
a strategy-proof and efficient rule has to be inverse-dictatorial,3 and hence dictato-
rial. From then on, many authors consider various restricted domains, either obtain
similar impossibility results or compromise with weakened axioms, such as Schum-
mer (1997, 2004), Ju (2003), Hashimoto (2008) and Momi (2011a) for two-agent
cases, and Barberà and Jackson (1995), Kato and Ohseto (2002, 2004), Amorós
(2002), Serizawa (2002), Serizawa and Weymark (2003), Ju (2004), Morimoto et al.
(2012) and Momi (2011b) for many-agent cases. As we mentioned before, both
Nicolò (2004) and Ghodsi et al. (2010) study the Leontief preference domain and
achieve positive results. The main difference between their works is that Nicolò
(2004) studies a two-agent two-good economy with generalized Leontief prefer-
ences and gives a characterization, while Ghodsi et al. (2010) study a many-agent
many-good economy with standard Leontief preferences and give several one-sided
results. In this paper, we consider generalized Leontief preferences and get very
positive characterization results for many-agent many-good economy, without weak-
ening any axioms. We would also like to mention that there is a large part of litera-
ture studying allocation rules for economies with public goods, such as Satterthwaite
and Sonnenschein (1981); Hurwicz and Walker (1990); Schummer (1999); Serizawa
(1999) and Moreno and Moscoso (2011).
3 A rule is inverse-dictatorial if there exists some agent who always gets nothing. In a two-agent economy,
it is equivalent to a dictatorial rule.
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2 The model
Throughout this paper, for all x, y ∈ Rm where m ∈ N, x ≥ y means that xk ≥
yk,∀k = 1, . . . , m; x > y means that xk > yk,∀k = 1, . . . , m. The latter will be the
order that we refer to when we consider totally ordered sets in Rm . Let Rm+ = {x ∈
R
m |x ≥ 0}, ˚Rm+ = {x ∈ Rm |x > 0}, and ∂Rm+ = Rm+ \ ˚Rm+. For any subsets S1 and S2
of Rm+, S1 + S2 = {s1 + s2|s1 ∈ S1, s2 ∈ S2}, and similarly S1 − S2 = {s1 − s2|s1 ∈
S1, s2 ∈ S2}.
Fix the set of perfectly divisible goods L = {1, . . . , l}, l ∈ N. Let Rl+ be the com-
modity space. Up to Sect. 3, every agent is assumed to have a standard Leontief prefer-
ence on Rl+, which can be represented by a utility function u(x) = mink∈L{ x
k
λk
}, ∀x ∈
R
l+, where xk denotes the amount of the k-th good, λk > 0, ∀k ∈ L , and
∑
k∈L λk = 1
for normalization. Let U denote the set of all such utility functions.4 We will generalize
this preference domain in Sect. 4.
Definition 1 Let u ∈ U with u(x) = mink∈L{ xkλk } be given. We call γ =
{(λ1t, . . . , λl t) ∈ Rl+|t ∈ R+} the critical set of the preference u.
A critical set of a preference u ∈ U consists of all the minimum commodity bundles
required to achieve given utility levels. It is a ray starting from the origin and thus a
connected, totally ordered and closed subset in Rl+. It is easy to see that γ is uniquely
defined for each u ∈ U . Hence, in the following, we will interchangeably use u and γ
as needed.
An economy E is a triple (N , uN , ω) where N ⊆ N is a nonempty finite set of
agents, uN = (ui )i∈N with ui ∈ U , ∀i ∈ N , is a preference profile, and ω ∈ Rl+ is
the social endowment of the economy. Upto Sect. 7, the resources are assumed to be
collectively owned. In Sect. 7, we consider the case where every agent has a private
endowment and their endowments are put together to be divided. Let E denote the set
of all economies.
Given (N , ω), the set of all feasible allocations is usually defined as A(N , ω) =
{x ∈ R|N |×l+ |
∑
i∈N xi ≤ ω}, where xi is the l dimensional bundle for agent i . We
further require that the bundle of each agent is in his critical set. The reason is that
the Leontief preferences are not strictly monotone, so society would like to keep the
redundant goods in this economy for alternative use, in the spirit of non-wastefulness.
Note that our main result does not hold when the allocations are allowed to be wasteful.
A counter-example will be given at the end of Sect. 3.
Formally, for any economy E = (N , uN , ω), we consider the restriction of A(N , ω)
on the critical sets, A∗(E) = A(N , ω)∩∏i∈N γi where γi is the critical set of ui . Let
A∗ = {A∗(E)|E ∈ E}.
Definition 2 An allocation rule (or rule for simplicity) is a mapping μ : E → A∗
with μ(E) ∈ A∗(E), assigning to each economy a non-wasteful feasible allocation.
For any i ∈ N , μi (E) denotes the bundle allocated to agent i .
4 We normalize the utility functions so that our rules only care about the ordinal properties. However, it is
not necessary for our result. It can be easily shown that any rule satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness
and consistency only takes into account the ordinal properties.
123
Egalitarian division under Leontief preferences
For notational simplicity, we write μ(uN ) (or μ(ω)) to denote μ(N , uN , ω), when
(N , ω) (or (N , uN )) is fixed.
Our normative requirements on rules are all very familiar in the literature (see the
Introduction).
(I) Efficiency
Efficiency naturally requires that a rule always assigns Pareto-optimal allocations.
Given E = (N , uN , ω), an allocation x ∈ A(N , ω) is efficient if there exists no
y ∈ A(N , ω) such that ui (yi ) ≥ ui (xi ) for all i ∈ N , and u j (y j ) > u j (x j ) for some
j ∈ N . A rule μ is efficient (EFFN) if μ(E) is efficient for every E ∈ E .
Lemma 1 Given E = (N , uN , ω), an allocation x ∈ A∗(E) is efficient if and only
if ∑i∈N xki = ωk for some k ∈ L, where xki denotes the amount of good k given to
agent i .
Proof For sufficiency, suppose the contrary that there exists y ∈ A(N , ω) such that
ui (yi ) ≥ ui (xi ) for all i ∈ N , and u j (y j ) > u j (x j ) for some j ∈ N . Then, yi ≥ xi
for all i ∈ N and y j > x j for some j ∈ N , since xi ∈ γi , ∀i ∈ N . Hence, ∑i∈N yi >∑
i∈N xi , and thus
∑
i∈N yki >
∑
i∈N xki = ωk , which contradicts feasibility. For
necessity, suppose the contrary that
∑
i∈N xi < ω. Then, consider the allocation
y ∈ A(N , ω) such that yi = xi , ∀i ∈ N \ { j}, and y j = x j + ω − ∑i∈N xi > x j .
Clearly, it implies that x is not efficient, which is a contradiction. 
unionsq
(II) Incentive compatibility
We require the familiar strategy-proofness and its strengthening as group strategy-
proofness.
Let US = U |S|, ∀S ⊆ N , and UN is the set of all preference profiles. For any
S ⊆ N , we denote by (u′S, u−S) the vector uN ∈ UN with ui replaced by u′i , ∀i ∈ S.
If S = {i}, we simply write (u′i , u−i ).
A rule μ is strategy-proof (SP) if ∀(N , uN , ω), ∀i ∈ N , ∀u′i ∈ U , ui (μi (uN )) ≥
ui (μi (u
′
i , u−i )).
A rule μ is group strategy-proof (GSP) if ∀(N , uN , ω), there does not exist S ⊆ N
and u′S ∈ US such that ui (μi (uN )) ≤ ui (μi (u′S, u−S)), ∀i ∈ S, and at least one
inequality is strict.
(III) Fairness
There are four classic fairness axioms: anonymity, envy-freeness, resource
monotonicity and population monotonicity. Envy-freeness and resource monotonicity
are known to be very demanding and usually incompatible.
Let π be a bijection on N. A rule μ is anonymous (ANON) if ∀π, ∀(N , uN , ω),
∀i ∈ N , μi (N , uN , ω) = μπ(i)(π(N ), (uπ( j))π(N ), ω) where uπ( j) = u j , ∀ j ∈ N .
Remark 1 If μ is ANON, then for any (N , uN , ω) such that ui = u j , i,
j ∈ N , μi (N , uN , ω) = μ j (N , uN , ω).
A rule μ is envy-free (EF) if ∀(N , uN , ω), ∀i, j ∈ N , ui (μi (N , uN , ω)) ≥
ui (μ j (N , uN , ω)).
A rule μ is resource monotonic (RM) if ∀(N , uN ), ∀ω,ω′ ∈ Rl+, ω > ω′ implies
that ui (μi (ω)) > ui (μi (ω′)), ∀i ∈ N .
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There is another version of resource monotonicity. It states that ∀(N , uN ), ∀ω,
ω′ ∈ Rl+, ω ≥ ω′ implies that ui (μi (ω)) ≥ ui (μi (ω′)), ∀i ∈ N . In general, these two
versions do not imply each other. However, our rules below satisfy both of them, and
the first one combined with the other axioms implies the second by our characterization
result.
A rule μ is population monotonic (PM) if ∀(N , uN , ω), ∀N ′ ⊆ N and
N ′ = ∅, ∀i ∈ N ′, ui (μi (N ′, uN ′ , ω)) ≥ ui (μi (N , uN , ω)).
(IV) Consistency
Consistency has played an important role in the rationing literature and also in the
fair division problems of discrete goods.
A rule μ is consistent (CST) if ∀(N , uN , ω), ∀N ′ ⊆ N and N ′ = ∅,
∀i ∈ N ′, μi (N , uN , ω) = μi (N ′, uN ′ , ω − ∑ j∈N\N ′ μi (N , uN , ω)).
Note that to check consistency, it is equivalent to check whether the corresponding
condition holds when |N ′| = |N | − 1.
Remark 2 It is easy to see that if a rule is consistent and resource monotonic (no
matter which version of resource monotonicity is adopted), then it must be population
monotonic. In the following, if a rule is CST and RM, we will just keep in mind that
it is also PM without even mentioning in the theorems.
3 Generalized egalitarian rules
Let f : D → Rn where D ⊆ Rm and m, n ∈ N be an arbitrary function. We say f is
strictly increasing if ∀x, y ∈ Rm, x > y implies that f (x) > f (y).
Suppose that W : ˚Rl+ ∪ {0} → R+ is a strictly increasing and continuous func-
tion. Given an economy E = (N , uN , ω), let AW (E) = {x ∈ A∗(E)|W (xi ) =
W (x j ),∀i, j ∈ N }.
Lemma 2 AW (E) is a totally ordered and closed set in R|N |×l . In particular,
max AW (E) exists.
Proof To show that AW (E) is totally ordered, let x, y ∈ AW (E) such that x = y be
given. Suppose without loss of generality (WLOG) that x j < y j for some j ∈ N . By
the definition of AW (E) and the properties of W , we know that ∀i ∈ N , xi , yi ∈ γi ,
and W (xi ) = W (x j ) < W (y j ) = W (yi ). Since the γi ’s are totally ordered sets and
W is strictly increasing, then xi < yi , ∀i ∈ N , and thus, x < y.
To see that max AW (E) exists, note that A∗(E) is closed and W is continuous.
Moreover, AW (E) is nonempty and bounded. Thus, max AW (E) exists. 
unionsq
Lemma 2 guarantees that the following rule is well defined.
Definition 3 A rule μ is called a generalized egalitarian rule, if there is a strictly
increasing continuous function W : ˚Rl+ ∪{0} → R+ such that for all E ∈ E, μ(E) =
max AW (E).
Let M denote the class of generalized egalitarian rules. We write μW when we
want to indicate that μ is generated by W .
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Fig. 1 Equalizing total wealth
We give two interpretations of our rules. One is in terms of a benchmark preference
on the commodity space. The other is related to “equal opportunity allocations”.
First, suppose that society has a benchmark preference over the commodity space
which is represented by W .5 Then, μW assigns to each agent the same welfare level
according to this benchmark preference of society. We use two examples to explain.
Example 1 Equalizing total wealth.
Fix a price vector p ∈ ˚Rl+. Let W (x) = p · x, ∀x ∈ ˚Rl+ ∪ {0}. In this case,
society wants the agents to get the same total wealth. The indifference classes of the
benchmark preference are just the budget lines. See Fig. 1 for an illustration in a
two-good economy.
Example 2 Egalitarian-equivalent (EE) rules.
The spirit of the classic EE rule is that every agent should get “equal” share of
the social endowment. The difficulty is to find a way of measuring these shares in a
world of ordinal preferences (Moulin 1995). Pazner and Schmeidler (1978) were the
first to propose a solution. It assigns an allocation at which the agents are indifferent
between their bundles and the same fraction of the social endowment. In our context,
that is, μ(E) = max{x ∈ A∗(E)|ui (xi ) = ui (tω),∀i ∈ N , t ∈ R+}. However, the
classic EE rule is not resource monotonic. Then, the e-EE rule is proposed to overcome
this drawback. The e-EE rule fixes an arbitrary reference bundle e ∈ ˚Rl+, and gives
the agents the shares between which and te they feel indifferent, where t is taken as
high as possible. Even more generally, fix a strictly increasing continuous function
ϕ : R+ → Rl+ such that limt→∞ ϕk(t) = ∞,∀k ∈ L , and ϕ(0) = 0. We can define
the ϕ-EE rule by μ(E) = max{x ∈ A∗(E)|ui (xi ) = ui (ϕ(t)),∀i ∈ N , t ∈ R+}. The
ϕ-EE rule makes all agents indifferent between their shares and the same commodity
bundle on the reference curve, that is, ϕ(t∗) for some t∗ ∈ R+. Hence, these shares are
“equal” as viewed by society. Note that the e-EE rule is the ϕ-EE rule with ϕ(t) = te.
We check that on the domain of Leontief preferences, the ϕ-EE rule is a special
case of the generalized egalitarian rules. Note that when ω is fixed, the classic EE rule
with ϕ(t) = tω is also a special case.
5 The value of W on ∂Rl+\{0 } is irrelevant, since A∗(E) ∩ ∂Rl+ = {0}. More rigorously, W represents a
benchmark preference on the interior and the origin of the commodity space.
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Fig. 2 ϕ-EE rules
Lemma 3 Let μ be a ϕ-EE rule. Define for all y ∈ ˚Rl+ ∪ {0}, W (y) = t if and only
if y ∈ {ϕ(t)} − ∂Rl+. Then, μ = μW .
Proof First, since ϕ is continuous and strictly increasing, W is well defined, and
moreover, continuous and strictly increasing.
Next, fix E = (N , uN , ω). Observe that ∀x ∈ A∗(E) and ∀i ∈ N , W (xi ) = t if
and only if xi ∈ {ϕ(t)}−∂Rl+, which is equivalent to ui (xi ) = ui (ϕ(t)) since xi ∈ γi .
Hence, μ = μW by the definitions. 
unionsq
Figure 2 shows in a two-commodity space, the indifference classes of the benchmark
preference W which is defined from ϕ.
The second interpretation relates to “equal opportunity allocations” proposed by
Thomson (1994). Such an allocation is obtained by having each agent choose by
himself in a common choice set. In this way, it gives the agents equal opportunities.
We reformulate the definition in our context.
Let C be a family of choice sets, where each C ∈ C is a nonempty subset of Rl+.
Definition 4 (Thomson 1994) Given an economy E = (N , uN , ω), a feasible alloca-
tion x is an equal opportunity allocation relative to the family C if there exists C ∈ C
such that ∀i ∈ N , xi ∈ arg maxy∈C ui (y).
Lemma 4 Let μW be given. Suppose C(t) = {y ∈ ˚Rl+ ∪ {0}|W (y) ≤ t}
where t ∈ R+. Let C = {C(t)|t ∈ R+}. Then, μW (E) = max{x ∈
A∗(E)|x is an equal opportuni ty allocation relative to C} for all E ∈ E .
Proof Let E be given. We only need to show that if x ∈ A∗(E), then W (xi ) =
W (x j ),∀i, j ∈ N is equivalent to that x is an equal opportunity allocation relative to
the family C. If W (xi ) = W (x j ),∀i, j ∈ N , then let t = W (xi ), and thus, xi is the
optimal bundle in C(t) for all i since both ui and W are strictly increasing. Conversely,
suppose that xi is the optimal bundle in C(t) for all i . If WLOG there exist x1 and x2,
such that W (x1) > W (x2), then we must have t ≥ W (x1) > W (x2). Thus, there must
exist x ′2 ∈ γ2 such that x ′2 > x2 and W (x ′2) < t . It contradicts that x2 is the optimal
bundle in C(t). 
unionsq
Hence, a generalized egalitarian rule always picks the Pareto-optimal equal oppor-
tunity allocation relative to the family of nested choice sets generated by W . In Exam-
ple 1, C is the class of all budget sets with a fixed price. In Example 2, C is the class
of box-shaped sets C with C = {y|y ≤ ϕ(λ)}.
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Fig. 3 A counter-example for wasteful allocation
Our first main result is a characterization of generalized egalitarian rules.
Theorem 1 (i) If a rule μ is in M, then it is efficient, resource monotonic, consistent,
group strategy-proof, anonymous and envy-free.
(ii) Let a rule μ be efficient, resource monotonic and consistent. If μ is either strategy-
proof and anonymous, or envy-free, then μ ∈ M.
In fact, Theorem 1 also holds for a much larger preference domain which is the
object of the next section.
The requirement of non-wasteful allocation is very important for Theorem 1. Con-
sider a natural extension of our rules to those which divide up every good. That is, first
apply a generalized egalitarian rule μW and then allocate the remaining goods equally
among the agents. More precisely, this extended rule μ¯ assigns for all E = (N , μN , ω)
and for all i ∈ N , μ¯i (E) = μWi (E)+ 1|N | (ω−
∑
i∈N μWi (E)). We show that μ¯ is not
SP by a counter-example. For simplicity, suppose that W = p · x where p > 0. Let
E = ({1, 2}, (u1, u2), ω) where (i) ω ∈ R2+ and ω2 is large enough so that good 2 is
always available in the following discussion; (ii) the slope of the critical set of u1 is
greater than that of u2. Let u′1 be such that the slope of its critical set is in between those
of u1 and u2. See Fig. 3 for an illustration. Let E ′ be E with u1 replaced by u′1. Suppose
that μW (E) = (x1, x2), μW (E ′) = (y1, y2), μ¯(E) = (x¯1, x¯2) and μ¯(E ′) = (y¯1, y¯2).
Since ω2 is large enough, then it is always good 1 that is divided up. We check that
y11 > x
1
1 . If y
1
1 ≤ x11 , then W (y2) = W (y1) < W (x1) = W (x2). Hence, y2 < x2, and
thus, y11 + y12 < x11 + x12 = ω1, which violates the efficiency of μW . Once again let
ω2 be large enough such that y¯21 = y21 + 12 (ω2 − y21 − y22 ) > x21 . Then, after dividing
the remaining good 2, y¯1 > x1, and thus, u1(y¯1) > u1(x1) = u1(x¯1). This example
can be easily extended to economies with more goods.
Hence, if one wants a rule to allocate all the goods and be EFFN and SP, then
one must carefully design the way that the useless goods are divided. Nicolò (2004)
provides such a rule in a two-agent two-good economy. However, there is no result
yet in a general economy.
Remark 3 In the characterization of Nicolò (2004), he introduces an incentive com-
patibility axiom stronger than strategy-proofness — fully implementability in truthful
strategies. It requires that a rule is strategy-proof and moreover when a misreport of
an agent does not change his own utility, the whole allocation is unaffected. Our rules
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Fig. 4 A generalized Leontief preference in a two-good economy
satisfy this axiom if and only if ∀x, y ∈ ˚Rl+ ∪ {0}, x ≥ y and x = y imply that
W (x) > W (y).
4 Generalized Leontief preferences
All the proofs of the results in this section are in the “Appendix”.
Let  be a complete and transitive binary relation on Rl+,  and ∼ be the corre-
sponding strict and indifferent relations. For all x ∈ Rl+, denote by U(x) = {y ∈
R
l+|yx} the upper contour set of x , and I(x) = {y ∈ Rl+|y ∼ x} its indifference
class.
Definition 5 The set of generalized Leontief preferences is defined by D = { on
R
l+|  is continuous and locally non-satiated, and ∀x ∈ Rl+, U(x) = {a} + Rl+ for
some a ∈ Rl+}.
Lemma 5 If  ∈ D, then
(i)  is monotone, that is, ∀x, y ∈ Rl+, x > y implies that x  y;
(ii) for any x ∈ Rl+, U(x) = {a} + Rl+ implies that I(x) = {a} + ∂Rl+.
Definition 6 For any  ∈ D, define γ = {a ∈ Rl+ : U(x) = {a} + Rl+ for some
x ∈ Rl+} to be the critical set of the preference .
Clearly, Definition 6 generalizes Definition 1 on the domain of generalized Leontief
preferences.
Lemma 6 For any  ∈ D,
(i) 0 ∈ γ, and γ is unbounded;
(ii) if a, b ∈ γ and a = b, then either a < b or a > b, that is, γ is totally ordered;
(iii) γ is connected;
(iv) γ is closed.
Figure 4 shows the typical upper contour set, the indifference class and the critical
set of a generalized Leontief preference in a two-good economy.
Proposition 1 For any  ∈ D,  is represented by u(x) = max{t ∈ R+|x ≥
ζ(t)}, ∀x ∈ Rl+, where ζ : R+ → γ is a strictly increasing homeomorphism such
that
∑
k∈L ζ k(t) = t, ∀t ∈ R+.
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For any x ∈ γ, x = ζ(t) for some t , and thus, u(x) = t = ∑k∈L xk . Hence, u
restricted on γ is a strictly increasing continuous function.
Let U˜ be the set of all utility functions representing generalized Leontief preferences
in the way specified in Proposition 1. Note that U˜ is a generalization of U , since for any
standard Leontief preference represented by u ∈ U with u(x) = mink∈L{ xkλk }, ζ(t) =
(λ1t, . . . , λl t), ∀t ∈ R+, and thus, u(x) = max{t ∈ R+|x ≥ ζ(t)}, ∀x ∈ Rl+, as
well.
It is easy to see that under the larger preference domain U˜ , all the previous notions
such as economy, rule and generalized egalitarian rule are still well defined. Moreover,
as we mentioned before, Theorem 1 still holds when U is replaced by U˜ .
Let M˜ denote the class of generalized egalitarian rules under the domain U˜ . For
simplicity, we will still use notations such as E, A∗(E) and μ to denote the corre-
sponding notions under the generalized preference domain.
Theorem 2 (i) If a rule μ is in M˜, then it is efficient, resource monotonic, consistent,
group strategy-proof, anonymous and envy-free.
(ii) Let a rule μ be efficient, resource monotonic and consistent. If μ is either strategy-
proof and anonymous, or envy-free, then μ ∈ M˜.
5 The proofs
Generally speaking, the structure of our problem has some resemblance to the “fixed
path” methods in the rationing literature, such as the parametric method in Young
(1987), and the fixed path rationing method in Moulin (1999). The essential idea of
the proof is to investigate how the given axioms impact the range of the rules. We
find that the range can be identified with some features which enable us to construct
a benchmark preference.
Here we prove Theorem 2. In fact, the result of every step in the following is
true under both preference domains. The proofs under U just involve less cases to
check. For the simplicity of presentation, we assume that a rule assigns to every
agent an unbounded bundle when the endowment increases, that is, ∀(N , uN ),
∀i ∈ N , μi (N , uN , Rl+) = {xi ∈ Rl+|μi (N , uN , ω) = xi for some ω ∈ Rl+} is
an unbounded subset in Rl+. This assumption is not necessary. The relaxation of it will
be discussed in the “Appendix”.
Step 1 If μ is EFFN and RM, then
(i) ∀(N , uN ), ∀x, x ′ ∈ μ(N , uN , Rl+) such that x = x ′, either xi < x ′i , ∀i ∈ N , or
xi > x
′
i , ∀i ∈ N ;
(ii) ∀(N , uN ), ∀i ∈ N , μi (N , uN , Rl+) = γi .
Proof Let (N , uN ) be given. Suppose WLOG that N = {1, . . . , n}.
(i) Assume that μ(ω) = x, μ(ω′) = x ′, ω, ω′ ∈ Rl+, and x = x ′.
First observe that if x j < x ′j for some j ∈ N , then xi ≤ x ′i for all i ∈ N . Suppose
the contrary WLOG that x1 < x ′1 and x2 > x ′2. Then,
∑
i∈N min{xi , x ′i } <
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∑
i∈N xi ≤ ω, and
∑
i∈N min{xi , x ′i } <
∑
i∈N x ′i ≤ ω′. Since μ is RM, then,
μi (
∑
i∈N min{xi , x ′i }) < min{xi , x ′i }, ∀i ∈ N , which violates the efficiency of
μ.
Next note that if y ∈ μ(Rl+), then μ(
∑
i∈N yi ) = y. Suppose the contrary WLOG
that μ(
∑
i∈N yi ) = y′ and y1 < y′1. By our previous result, yi ≤ y′i , ∀i ∈ N .
Thus,
∑
i∈N y′i >
∑
i∈N yi , which violates feasibility.
Hence, we can take ω = ∑i∈N xi and ω′ =
∑
i∈N x ′i . Suppose WLOG that
x1 = x ′1. If x1 < x ′1, then we know that xi ≤ x ′i , ∀i ∈ N . Thus, ω < ω′. Since μ
is RM, then xi < x ′i , ∀i ∈ N . Similarly, if x1 > x ′1, then xi > x ′i , ∀i ∈ N .
(ii) Suppose the contrary WLOG that a ∈ γ1 \ μ1(Rl+). Since 0 ∈ μ1(Rl+) and
μ1(R
l+) is unbounded, then ν = {x ∈ μ(Rl+)|x1 < a} and ν¯ = {x ∈ μ(Rl+)|x1 >
a} are nonempty. Let ω = sup{∑i∈N xi |x ∈ ν}6 and ω¯ = inf{
∑
i∈N xi |x ∈ ν¯}.
By (i), ν ∪ ν¯ = μ(Rl+) is totally ordered, so ω and ω¯ are well defined, and ω ≤ ω¯.
If ω < ω¯, then pick ω such that ω < ω < ω¯. By the choice of ω, μ(ω) /∈ ν ∪ ν¯,
which is a contradiction. If ω = ω¯, let y = sup ν = inf ν¯, and then y1 = a. Let
(y′i )i∈N = μ(
∑
i∈N yi ). By assumption y′1 = y1. If y1 < y′1, then y′ ∈ ν¯ and thus
y′i ≥ yi , ∀i ∈ N . Hence,
∑
i∈N y′i >
∑
i∈N yi , which violates the feasibility. If
y1 > y′1, then by a similar argument the efficiency is violated.

unionsq
Step 2 If μ ∈ M˜ is EFFN, RM and CST, then
(i) ∀(N , uN ), ∀N ′ ⊆ N , (xi )i∈N ∈ μ(N , uN , Rl+) implies that (xi )i∈N ′ ∈
μ(N ′, uN ′ , Rl+);
(ii) ∀(N1, uN1) and (N2, uN2) such that N1 ∩ N2 = ∅, ∀(xi )i∈N1 ∈ μ(N1, uN1 , Rl+)
and (xi )i∈N2 ∈ μ(N2, uN2 , Rl+), if for some i1 ∈ N1 and i2 ∈ N2, (xi1 , xi2) ∈
μ({i1, i2}, (ui1 , ui2), Rl+), then (xi )i∈N ∈ μ(N , uN , Rl+) where N = N1 ∪ N2
and uN = (uN1 , uN2).
Proof Obviously, (i) follows from Step 1 (i) and the definition of consistency.
For (ii), suppose the contrary that under the required condition, (xi )i∈N /∈
μ(N , uN , Rl+). Then, assume that μ(N , uN ,
∑
i∈N xi ) = (x ′i )i∈N = (xi )i∈N . Thus,
there must exist some j ∈ N such that x ′j < x j . Suppose WLOG that j ∈ N1. By
(i), we know that (x ′i )i∈N1 ∈ μ(N1, uN1 , Rl+), (x ′i1 , x ′i2) ∈ μ({i1, i2}, (ui1 , ui2), Rl+),
and (x ′i )i∈N2 ∈ μ(N2, uN2 , Rl+). From our assumption and Step 1, we have that
x ′i < xi , ∀i ∈ N1, and thus x ′i2 < xi2 , and finally x ′i < xi , ∀i ∈ N2. Hence,∑
i∈N x ′i <
∑
i∈N xi , which violates that μ is EFFN. 
unionsq
Remark 4 It can also be shown that if μ is EFFN and RM, then both (i) and (ii) of
Step 2 are sufficient conditions for μ to be CST.
Step 3 Suppose that μ is EFFN, RM and CST. Then, μ is SP if and only if ∀(N , uN )
such that |N | = 2, ∀i ∈ N , ∀u′i ∈ U˜ , if (xi , x−i ) ∈ μ(N , uN , Rl+) and (x ′i , x−i ) ∈
μ(N , u′N , R
l+) where u′N = (u′i , u−i ), then xi ≮ x ′i .
6 For all A ⊆ Rm , m ∈ N, (sup A)k = sup{ak : a ∈ A}, k = 1, . . . , m; inf A is similarly defined.
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Fig. 5 Necessity for Step 3 (strategy-proofness)
Fig. 6 Sufficiency for Step 3 (strategy-proofness)
Proof For necessity, suppose the contrary WLOG that N = {1, 2}, and under the
required condition, x1 < x ′1. Since γ ′1 is connected, we can find y′1 ∈ γ ′1 such that
y′1 ∈ {x1} + ∂Rl+. See Fig. 5 for an illustration in a two-good economy.
Let ω = y′1 + x2. By Step 1 (i), μ(N , uN , ω) = (x1, x2). We assume that
μ(N , u′N , ω) = (y1, y2). Since (x ′1, x2) ∈ μ(N , u′N , Rl+) and x ′1 + x2 > x1 + x2,
then y1 < x ′1 and y2 < x2. Thus, by efficiency, y1 > y′1 ≥ x1. This means that in the
economy (N , uN , ω), agent 1 has incentive to misreport his preference, which violates
that μ is SP.
For sufficiency, given the required assumption, we want to show that μ is SP. WLOG
let (N , uN , ω) where N = {1, . . . , n}, and u′1 ∈ U˜ be given. Let μ(N , uN , ω) =
(xi )i∈N , and μ(N , u′N , ω) = (x ′i )i∈N where u′N = (u′1, u−1). See Fig. 6.
We can find y1 ∈ γ ′1 such that (y1, x2) ∈ μ({1, 2}, (u′1, u2), Rl+). By consis-
tency, (x1, x2) ∈ μ({1, 2}, (u1, u2), Rl+). By the required assumption, x1 ≮ y1.
Hence, if x ′1 ≤ y1, then x1 ≮ x ′1. Consider the other case that x ′1 > y1. By con-
sistency, (x2, . . . , xn) ∈ μ(N \ {1}, uN\{1}, Rl+). From Step 2, consider (N1, uN1) =
({1}, u′1), (N2, uN2) = (N \ {1}, uN\{1}), and thus (y1, x2, . . . , xn) ∈ μ(N , u′N , Rl+).
Hence, x ′i > xi , ∀i = 2, . . . , n. If x ′1 > x1, then ω ≥
∑
i∈N x ′i >
∑
i∈N xi , which
violates the efficiency. Hence, x1 ≮ x ′1 and agent 1 has no incentive to misreport his
preference. 
unionsq
Step 4 A rule μ ∈ M˜ if and only if μ is EFFN, RM, CST, SP and ANON.
Proof For necessity, let μ ∈ M˜ and (N , uN , ω) be given. To check efficiency, by
Lemma 1, we only need to check that some commodity is divided up. Suppose the
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Fig. 7 Independence of the choice of ux
contrary that μ(N , uN , ω) = x and ∑i∈N xi < ω. We can find for each i ∈ N x ′i ∈ γi
such that x ′i > xi and
∑
i∈N x ′i ≤ ω, since γi ’s are connected. Pick t ∈ R+ such that
W (xi ) < t < W (x ′i ), ∀i ∈ N . Since W is continuous and γi ’s are connected, then
W (γi )’s are connected. Thus, for each i ∈ N there exists yi ∈ γi such that W (yi ) = t .
Clearly,
∑
i∈N yi <
∑
i∈N x ′i ≤ ω, which contradicts that μ(N , uN , ω) = x by the
definition of μ.
To verify that μ is RM, fix ω′ such that ω′ > ω. Then, using the similar argument
as above, we can show that the bundle allocated to every agent is strictly increased.
Consistency follows from the definition of μ, the efficiency of μ and the assumption
that W is strictly increasing.
Strategy-proofness follows from Step 3 and strict increasingness of W .
Lastly, anonymity is simply because μ does not depend on agents’ names, but their
preferences.
For sufficiency, suppose that μ is EFFN, RM, CST, SP and ANON. Fix u¯ ∈ U˜ .
Define W : ˚Rl+ ∪ {0} → R+ as follows. For any x ∈ ˚Rl+ ∪ {0}, choose ux ∈ U˜ such
that its critical set γx contains x . Choose N = {1, 2}, u1 = u¯, and u2 = ux . From
Step 1, we know that there uniquely exists x¯ ∈ γ¯ such that (x¯, x) ∈ μ(N , uN , Rl+).
Define W (x) = u¯(x¯). The choice of ux does not matter, since for any other u′x ∈ U˜
such that x ∈ γ ′x and the corresponding x¯ ′ = x¯ , WLOG say x¯ ′ < x¯ , then there must
be an x ′ ∈ γx such that x ′ < x and (x¯ ′, x ′) ∈ μ(N , (u¯, ux ), Rl+), which contradicts
that μ is SP by Step 3. See Fig. 7 for an illustration in a two-good economy. Hence,
W is well defined. Note that for any x ∈ γ¯ , we can pick ux = u¯. Since μ is ANON,
then μi (N , uN , 2x) = x, i = 1, 2, and thus W (x) = u¯(x) for all x ∈ γ¯ .
To check that W is strictly increasing, let x, y ∈ Rl+ such that x < y. We can find
u ∈ U˜ whose critical set contains both x and y. Find x¯, y¯ ∈ γ¯ such that (x, x¯), (y, y¯) ∈
μ({1, 2}, (u¯, u), Rl+). Clearly, x¯ < y¯, and thus W (x) = u¯(x¯) < u¯(y¯) = W (y).
To verify that W is continuous, we only need to check that W−1((t,∞)) and
W−1([0, s)) are open sets in ˚Rl+ ∪ {0} when t ≥ 0 and s > 0. Let t ≥ 0 and
x ∈ W−1((t,∞)) be given. Let ux and x¯ be correspondingly given. By Proposition
1, we can find x¯t ∈ γ¯ such that u¯(x¯t ) = t . By Step 1 (ii), there exists xt ∈ γx such
that W (xt ) = t . See Fig. 8. Since x ∈ γx and W (x) > t , then x > xt . Thus, there
exists 
 > 0 such that B
(x) = {y ∈ Rl+| ||y − x || < 
} ⊆ {xt } + ˚Rl+. For all
y ∈ B
(x), y > xt , and thus W (y) > W (xt ) = t . Hence, B
(x) ⊆ W−1((t,∞)),
which implies that W−1((t,∞)) is open. Similarly, we have that W−1([0, s)) is open
for all s > 0.
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Fig. 8 The continuity of W
Finally, we check that ∀E = (N , uN , ω), μ(E) = max{x ∈ A∗(E)|W (xi ) =
W (x j ), ∀i, j ∈ N }. Suppose that μ(E) = (x∗i )i∈N . Fix i, j ∈ N , and i = j .
Assume WLOG that 1 /∈ N . By the construction of W and the anonymity of μ,
there exists x¯ such that (x¯, x∗i ) ∈ μ({1, i}, (u¯, ui ), Rl+). Since μ is CST, (x∗i , x∗j ) ∈
μ({i, j}, (ui , u j ), Rl+). Using Step 2 (ii), consider N1 = {1}, N2 = {i, j}, we get
that (x¯, x∗i , x∗j ) ∈ μ({1, i, j}, (u¯, ui , u j ), Rl+). By the consistency of μ, (x¯, x∗j ) ∈
μ({1, j}, (u¯, u j ), Rl+). Since μ is ANON, W (x∗i ) = W (x∗j ). Since μ is EFFN,
(x∗i )i∈N = max{x ∈ A∗(E)|W (xi ) = W (x j ), ∀i, j ∈ N }. 
unionsq
Step 5 If μ is in M˜, then μ is GSP.
Proof Let (N , uN , ω), S ⊆ N , and u′N = (u′S, u−S) where u′S ∈ U˜S be given.
Assume that μ(N , uN , ω) = x and μ(N , u′N , ω) = x ′. Suppose the contrary that∀i ∈ S, ui (x ′i ) ≥ ui (xi ), and ∃ j ∈ S such that u j (x ′j ) > u j (x j ). Hence, ∀i ∈
S, x ′i ≥ xi and x ′j > x j . Thus, W (x ′j ) > W (x j ), which by the definition of μ implies
that ∀i ∈ N \ S, x ′i > xi . Therefore,
∑
i∈N xi <
∑
i∈N x ′i ≤ ω, which contradicts the
efficiency of μ. 
unionsq
Step 6 A rule μ is in M˜ if and only if μ is EFFN, RM, CST and EF.
Proof For necessity, let μ ∈ M˜ be given. We only need to check that μ is EF. This
simply follows from the definition of μ and the assumption that W is strictly increasing.
For sufficiency, suppose that μ is EFFN, RM, CST and EF. First we show that μ
is ANON. Let a bijection π on N, and an economy E = (N , uN , ω) be given. Let
E ′ = (π(N ), (uπ(i))π(N ), ω) where ui = uπ(i), ∀i ∈ N . Assume that μ(E) = x
and μ(E ′) = x ′. Suppose the contrary WLOG that 1, 2 ∈ N and x1 < x ′π(1) and
x2 > x
′
π(2). We can find x
′
1 ∈ γ1 such that (x ′1, x ′π(2)) ∈ μ({1, 2}, (u1, u2), Rl+). Note
that x ′1 < x1 < x ′π(1) since x
′
π(2) < x2. See Fig. 9.
Suppose that {1, 2} ∩ {π(1), π(2)} = ∅. Since μ is EFFN and EF, then
μ({2, π(2)}, (u2, u2), 2x ′π(2)) = (x ′π(2), x ′π(2)). Thus, by Step 2 (ii), (x ′1, x ′π(2), x ′π(2),
x ′π(1)) ∈ μ({1, 2, π(2), π(1)}, (u1, u2, u2, u1), Rl+), and agent 1 will envy agent
π(1) which is a contradiction. If {1, 2} ∩ {π(1), π(2)} = ∅, then pick i1, i2 ∈ N
such that {1, 2, π(1), π(2)} ∩ {i1, i2} = ∅. From the above result, we know that
(x ′π(1), x
′
π(2)) ∈ μ({i1, i2}, (u1, u2), Rl+). Applying the same argument to the agents
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Fig. 9 The anonymity of μ
1, 2, i1, i2 with the preferences u1, u2, u1, u2, respectively, we again will get a con-
tradiction.
Now we only need to show that μ is SP. By Step 3, suppose WLOG that
μ({1, 2}, (u1, u2), ω) = (x1, x2) and μ({1, 2}, (u′1, u2), ω′) = (x ′1, x2), and we
want to check whether x1 ≮ x ′1. Let u3 = u′1. Since μ is ANON, then
μ({3, 2}, (u3, u2), ω) = (x ′1, x2). Since μ is CST, then by Step 2 μ({1, 2, 3},
(u1, u2, u3), ω′′) = (x1, x2, x ′1) for some ω′′ ∈ Rl+. Since μ is EF, then u1(x1) ≥
u1(x
′
1), and thus x1 ≮ x ′1. 
unionsq
6 Tightness of the characterization
By Theorem 2, a rule is in M˜ if and only if one of the following equivalent conditions
holds:
(i) it is EFFN, RM, CST, ANON and SP;
(ii) it is EFFN, RM, CST, ANON and GSP;
(iii) it is EFFN, RM, CST and EF.
Our characterization is tight with respect to all these axioms when there are at least
two goods in the economy.7 The tightness result for Theorem 1 is the same.
Drop the efficiency, and consider the rule μ¯ such that for all E = (N , uN , ω), μ¯(E)
= max{x ∈ A∗(E)|W (xi ) = t,∀i ∈ N ;∑i∈N xi ≤ ω − te} where W is as in
Example 1, and e is the unit vector in the commodity space. It can be checked that
μ¯ is well defined, and is RM, CST, ANON, GSP and EF. The key fact used to verify
these properties is that if W (μ¯i (E)) = t, ∀i ∈ N , then ∑i∈N μ¯ki (E) = ωk − t for
some k ∈ L . However, the allocation given by this rule is never efficient when ω > 0.
Drop the resource monotonicity, and the following rule μ¯ is EFFN, CST, ANON,
GSP and EF. Here we define μ¯ in a two-good economy for simplicity, and it can be
easily extended to the economies with more than two goods. Consider for each t ∈ R+,
a parameterized indifference curve q(t) such that: q(t) = {x ∈ R2+|x1 +x2 = t} when
t ∈ [0, 2]; q(t) = {x ∈ R2+|x1 + (t − 1)x2 = t , where x1 ≥ 1 or (t − 1)x1 + x2 = t ,
where x1 ≤ 1} when t ∈ [2, 4], and q(t) = {x ∈ R2+|x1 + 3x2 = t , where x1 ≥ t4
7 It is easy to see that if there is only one good in the economy, then efficiency and either anonymity or
envy-freeness will suffice to characterize the rules tightly.
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Fig. 10 Tightness of resource monotonicity
or 3x1 + x2 = t , where x1 ≤ t4 } when t ∈ [4,+∞). Let W : R2+ → R+ be
a set-valued correspondence such that W (x) = {t |x ∈ q(t)}. Notice that W (x) is
always single-valued except for W (1, 1) = [2, 4]. For each E = (N , uN , ω), let
μ¯(E) = max{x ∈ A∗(E)|∏i∈N IW (xi )(t) = 0 for some t ∈ R} where IW (xi )(t) = 1
when t ∈ W (xi ), and IW (xi )(t) = 0 when t ∈ R \ W (xi ) for all i . It is a well-defined
rule, satisfies all the axioms except for resource monotonicity. For a counter-example,
consider a preference profile (u1, u2) such that γ2 contains x2 = (1, 1), as shown
in Fig. 10. Let x1 ∈ γ1 ∩ q(2) and x ′1 ∈ γ1 ∩ q(t) for some t ∈ (2, 4). Then,
μ¯(x1 + x2) = (x1, x2), μ¯(x ′1 + x2) = (x ′1, x2). In this case, x1 + x2 < x ′1 + x2 but
agent 2 is not better off. Note that this rule still satisfies the second version of resource
monotonicity.
Drop the consistency, and consider the rule μ¯ such that for all E =(N , uN , ω), μ¯(E)
= μW1(E) if |N | is even and μ¯(E) = μW2(E) if |N | is odd where W1 and W2 are
as in Example 1 with different p’s. Obviously, μ¯ is EFFN, RM, ANON, GSP and EF,
but not CST.
Drop the anonymity, and consider the rule μ¯ such that for all E = (N , uN , ω) with
1 /∈ N , μ¯(E) = μW (E) where W is as in Example 1, and for all E = (N , uN , ω)
with 1 ∈ N , μ¯(E) = max{x ∈ A∗(E)|2W (x1) = W (xi ), ∀i ∈ N \ {1}}. It is a
well-defined rule, and is EFFN, RM, CST, GSP, but not ANON. We will prove this
result for a general class of such rules in the next section.
Drop the strategy-proofness (and thus the group strategy-proofness), and consider
the following rule μ¯ which is EFFN, ANON, RM and CST. Let u¯ ∈ U˜ be fixed. For
all E = (N , uN , ω), μ¯(E) = μW (E) if ∀i ∈ N , ui = u¯, and if S = { j ∈ N |u j =
u¯} = ∅, μ¯(E) = max{x ∈ A∗(E)|2W (x j ) = W (xi ), j ∈ S, i ∈ N \ S} where W
is as in Example 1. It is easy to check that μ¯ is well defined and satisfies the above
axioms. Figure 11 illustrates that μ¯ is not SP (and thus not GSP) in a two-commodity
space. Consider a two-agent economy where their utility profile is as given in Fig. 11.
Suppose that μ¯({1, 2}, (u1, u2), ω) = (x1, x2) for some ω ∈ R2+. Then, agent 1 prefers
to report u′1 which is very “close” to u1. The point on γ ′1 “moves” faster than on γ1,
so after agent 1’s misreport, it must be that his allocated bundle x ′1 > x1.
Drop the envy-freeness, and the above two rules also work as counter-examples.
This is because envy-freeness implies anonymity and strategy-proofness when a rule
is EFFN, RM and CST.
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Fig. 11 Tightness of strategy-proofness
7 Agent-specific egalitarian rules
Now we consider a natural extension of M˜ to a class of non-anonymous rules. While
generalized egalitarian rules equalize the agents’ final welfare levels according to a
benchmark preference over the commodity space, society may measure the welfare of
each agent differently. It may attach to each agent i a utility function Wi and equalize
the agents’ final welfare according to these agent-specific utility functions.
Formally, for all i ∈ N, let Wi : ˚Rl+ ∪{0} → R+ be a strictly increasing continuous
function such that Wi (0) = 0. Let Wa = {Wi |i ∈ N} be a set of all agents’ welfare
indices.
Definition 7 A rule μ is called an agent-specific egalitarian rule if there exists Wa
such that for all E ∈ E ,
μ(E) = max{x ∈ A∗(E)|Wi (xi ) = W j (x j ), ∀i, j ∈ N }
where Wi ∈ Wa, ∀i ∈ N . Let Ma denote the class of agent-specific egalitarian rules.
Using the similar argument as in the proof of Lemma 2, it is easy to see that the
analogous result holds, and Ma is well defined.
Theorem 3 If μ is in Ma, then μ is efficient, resource monotonic, consistent and
group strategy-proof.
Proof The proof is almost the same as what we did for generalized egalitarian rules.
Just by replacing W (xi ) with Wi (xi ) in Step 4 and 5 of Sect. 5, we can get the desired
results. 
unionsq
8 Endowment-specific egalitarian rules and private property
Another extension ofM˜ is natural when we drop the common property assumption. We
first introduce the model where every agent has a private endowment. For notational
simplicity, we will abuse the previous symbols again to denote the corresponding
notions in the model with private property.
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An economy E is a triple (N , uN , ωN ) where N ⊆ N is a nonempty finite set of
agents, uN = (ui )i∈N with ui ∈ U˜ , ∀i ∈ N , is a preference profile, and ωN = (ωi )i∈N
with ωi ∈ Rl+, ∀i ∈ N , denotes a vector of private endowments of the agents. Let E
be the set of all economies.
Given (N , ωN ), the set of all feasible allocations is A(N , ωN ) = {x ∈ R|N |×l+ |∑
i∈N xi ≤
∑
i∈N ωi }. For any economy E = (N , uN , ωN ), the set of non-wasteful
feasible allocations is A∗(E) = A(N , ωN )∩∏i∈N γi where γi is the critical set of ui .
Let A∗ = {A∗(E)|E ∈ E}. A rule is a mapping μ : E → A∗ such that μ(E) ∈ A∗(E)
for all E ∈ E .
When the private property is introduced, an important problem is whether the agents
are willing to put their own endowments together and participate in the social realloca-
tion. Hence, here we need the individual rationality axiom to guarantee the voluntary
participation.
A rule μ is individually rational (IR) if ∀(N , uN , ωN ), ∀i ∈ N , ui (μi (N , uN ,∑
i∈N ωi )) ≥ ui (ωi ).
The efficiency, incentive compatibility and fairness axioms are defined in the same
way as the previous ones, except a little modification on anonymity and resource
monotonicity.
Let π be a bijection on N. A rule μ is anonymous if ∀π, ∀(N , uN , ωN ), ∀i ∈ N ,
μi (N , uN , ωN ) = μπ(i)(π(N ), (uπ( j))π(N ), (ωπ( j))π(N )) where u j = uπ( j) and
ω j = ωπ( j), ∀ j ∈ N .
A rule μ is resource monotonic if ∀(N , uN ), ∀ωN , ω′N ∈ R|N |×l+ , ωi > ω′i for all
i ∈ N implies that ui (μi (ωN )) > ui (μi (ω′N )).
Resource monotonicity is shown to be incompatible with efficiency and individual
rationality in Moulin and Thomson (1988). Although they assume a larger preference
domain and use another version of resource monotonicity, it is easy to check that with
a slight modification their counter-example still works in our context.
Our last result shows that when we allow the welfare index of an agent to depend
on his private endowment, we obtain a class of rules which is EFFN, GSP, ANON and
IR.
For all x ∈ Rl+, let Wx : ˚Rl+ ∪ {0} → R+ be a strictly increasing and continuous
function such that for all y ∈ ˚Rl+ ∪ {0} with y ≤ x and yk = xk for some k ∈ L ,
Wx (y) = 1. 8 Let We = {Wx |x ∈ Rl+}.
Definition 8 A rule μ is called an endowment-specific egalitarian rule, if there exists
We such that for all E ∈ E ,
μ(E) = max{x ∈ A∗(E)|Wωi (xi ) = Wω j (x j ), ∀i, j ∈ N }
where Wωi ∈ We, ∀i ∈ N . Let Me denote the class of endowment-specific egalitarian
rules.
By the analogous result of Lemma 2, Me is well defined.
8 Essentially, what we need is that Wx (y) is some constant which is independent of x .
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Theorem 4 If a rule μ is in Me, then it is efficient, group strategy-proof, anonymous
and individually rational.
Proof The proof of efficiency, group strategy-proofness and anonymity is basically
the same as in Step 4 and 5 of Sect. 5.
To see that μ is IR, note that for all E = (N , uN , ωN ), there exists the allocation
x ∈ A∗(E) such that ∀i ∈ N , ui (xi ) = ui (ωi ) and Wωi (xi ) = 1. Hence, ∀i ∈ N ,
μi (E) ≥ xi and then ui (μi (E)) ≥ ui (ωi ). 
unionsq
9 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we study fair allocation rules on the generalized Leontief preference
domain and achieve very positive results. Nevertheless, there are still some immediate
open questions. The characterization of the agent-specific and endowment-specific
egalitarian rules remains open. Another intriguing question is how we could drop the
non-wastefulness assumption of the rules and still get some positive results. We also
observe that recently de Castro et al. (2011) find nice properties of consumption allo-
cation in asymmetric information economies under Maximin preferences, which has
some structural resemblance to Leontief preferences without uncertainty. We would
like to investigate the relationship between the two problems in the future.
10 Appendix
10.1 The proofs of the results in Section 3
Lemma 5 If  ∈ D, then
(i)  is monotone, that is, ∀x, y ∈ Rl+, x > y implies that x  y;
(ii) for any x ∈ Rl+, U(x) = {a} + Rl+ implies that I(x) = {a} + ∂Rl+.
Proof Let  ∈ D be given.
(i) Suppose that x, y ∈ Rl+ and x > y. Since  is locally non-satiated, we can find
y′ < x such that y′  y. Let U(y′) = {a} + Rl+, a ∈ Rl+. Since y′ ∈ U(y′)
and x > y′, then x ≥ a, and thus x ∈ U(y′). Hence, xy′  y.
(ii) Suppose that x ∈ Rl+ and U(x) = {a} + Rl+. By (i), ∀y ∈ {a} + ˚Rl+, y  x .
Now let y ∈ {a} + ∂Rl+. Since  is continuous, if y  x , then there exists
y′ < y such that y′  x , which contradicts that U(x) = {a} + Rl+. Hence,
I(x) = {a} + ∂Rl+. 
unionsq
Lemma 6 For any  ∈ D,
(i) 0 ∈ γ, and γ is unbounded;
(ii) if a, b ∈ γ and a = b, then either a < b or a > b, that is, γ is totally ordered;
(iii) γ is connected;
(iv) γ is closed.
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Proof Let  ∈ D be given.
(i) To see 0 ∈ γ, it suffices to show that U(0) = {0}+Rl+. Suppose the contrary
that U(0) = {a} + Rl+ where a = 0. Then, it implies that 0 /∈ U(0), a
contradiction.
For unboundedness, suppose the contrary that there exists y ∈ Rl+ such that
∀a ∈ γ, a < y. Suppose U(y) = {b} + Rl+. Then, b ∈ γ and I(y) =
{b} + ∂Rl+. Thus, b ≤ y and yk = bk for some k ∈ {1, . . . , l}, which is a
contradiction.
(ii) Let a, b ∈ γ and a = b. Suppose that U(x) = {a} + Rl+ and U(y) =
{b} + Rl+, x, y ∈ Rl+. It is not true that x ∼ y, otherwise a = b. By Lemma 5
(ii), a ∼ x and b ∼ y. If x  y, then a  y and thus a ∈ {b}+ ˚Rl+, which means
a > b. Similarly, if y  x , then a < b.
(iii) Define ρ : γ → R+ such that ρ(x) = ∑k∈L xk, ∀x ∈ γ. It suffices to show
that ρ is a homeomorphism.
The injectivity of ρ follows from (ii). We first prove that ρ is surjective. Suppose
the contrary that there exists t ∈ R+ \ ρ(γ). Then, γ = α ∪ β where α =
{a ∈ γ|ρ(a) < t} and β = {b ∈ γ|ρ(b) > t}. By (i) we know that ρ(0) = 0,
and sup ρ(γ) = ∞. Hence, α, β = ∅. Let a¯ = sup α and b = inf β. Clearly,
a¯, b ∈ Rl+ and a¯ ≤ b. If there exists h ∈ L such that a¯h < bh , then pick
x ∈ Rl+ such that a¯ < x and xh < bh . Suppose I(x) = {c} + ∂Rl+. Thus,
c ∈ β and x ≥ c, which contradicts that xh < bh . Hence, a¯ = b. Then, by (ii),
I(a¯) = {a¯} + ∂Rl+. Thus, either a¯ ∈ α or a¯ ∈ β. If a¯ ∈ α, then ρ(a¯) < t . We
can choose b ∈ β such that ρ(b) is arbitrarily close to ρ(a¯), and this contradicts
that ρ(b) > t . Similarly, if a¯ ∈ β, we can also get a contradiction.
Next observe that for any x, y ∈ γ, ||x − y|| ≤ |ρ(x) − ρ(y)| ≤ l||x − y||,9
since either x < y or x > y. Hence, ρ is a continuous open mapping.
(iv) Let {an}∞n=1 be a sequence of elements in γ such that limn→∞ an = a. If
a /∈ γ, then γ = [γ ∩ ({a} + Rl+)] ∪ [γ ∩ ({a} − Rl+)], since γ is totally
ordered and a is the limit of a sequence of elements in γ. This contradicts that
γ is connected.

unionsq
Proposition 1 For any  ∈ D,  is represented by u(x) = max{t ∈ R+|x ≥
ζ(t)}, ∀x ∈ Rl+, where ζ : R+ → γ is a strictly increasing homeomorphism such
that
∑
k∈L ζ k(t) = t, ∀t ∈ R+.
Proof Let  ∈ D be given. Suppose that ρ is defined as in the proof of Lemma 6
(iii). Clearly, ρ is strictly increasing since γ is totally ordered. Let ζ = ρ−1. Hence,
all the properties of ζ follows from those of ρ. Since ζ(R+) is unbounded and ζ is
continuous, then {t ∈ R+|x ≥ ζ(t)} is bounded and closed for any x ∈ Rl+, and thus
u : Rl+ → R+ is well defined.
Now we show that u represents . If x ∼ y and I(x) = {a} + ∂Rl+, then
u(x) = u(y) = ∑k∈L ak , since ζ is strictly increasing. If x  y, I(x) = {a}+∂Rl+
9 || · || is the standard Euclidean norm.
123
J. Li, J. Xue
and I(y) = {b} + ∂Rl+, then by Lemmas 6(ii) and 5(i), a > b. Thus, u(x) =∑
k∈L ak >
∑
k∈L bk = u(y). 
unionsq
10.2 The relaxation of the unbounded allocation assumption
There are several places in the steps of the proofs to be modified when we drop the
assumption that ∀(N , uN ), ∀i ∈ N , μi (N , uN , Rl+) is unbounded.
Step 1 (ii) Suppose thatμ is EFFN and RM. If for (N , uN ) and i ∈ N , μi (N , uN , Rl+)
is bounded, thenμi (N , uN , Rl+) = {xi ∈ γi |xi < x∗i } for some x∗i ∈ γi , and moreover,
there exists j ∈ N such that μ j (N , uN , Rl+) = γ j .
Proof Let (N , uN ) and i ∈ N be given. Suppose that μi (Rl+) is bounded. Let x∗i =
sup μ(Rl+). Since γi is closed, then x∗i ∈ γi . Note that if xi ∈ μi (Rl+), then xi + 
 ∈
μi (R
l+) for some 
 > 0, since μ is RM. Hence, x∗i /∈ μi (Rl+). Then, using the
similar argument as in the proof of Step 1, we get that ∀xi ∈ γi such that xi <
x∗i , xi ∈ μi (Rl+). If ∀i ∈ N , μi (Rl+) is bounded, then pick ω ≥
∑
i∈N x∗i , and thus∑
i∈N μi (ω) <
∑
i∈N x∗i ≤ ω, which contradicts that u is EFFN. 
unionsq
Step 3 The sufficiency part.
Proof Let all the assumptions as in the sufficiency proof of Step 3 be given. we
only need to check the case when there does not exist y1 ∈ γ ′1 such that (y1, x2) ∈
μ({1, 2}, (u′1, u2), Rl+). Pick y′1 ∈ γ ′1 such that y′1 > x1. By the modified Step 1 (ii),
we can find y2 ∈ γ2 such that (y′1, y2) ∈ μ({1, 2}, (u′1, u2), Rl+), and y2 < x2. Since
μ is CST, (x1, x2) ∈ μ({1, 2}, (u1, u2), Rl+). Again by the modified Step 1, there exist
y1 ∈ γ1 such that (y1, y2) ∈ μ({1, 2}, (u1, u2), Rl+). Since y2 < x2, then y1 < x1,
and thus y1 < y′1, which contradicts our assumption. 
unionsq
Step 4 The sufficiency part.
Proof We first show the following two statements:
(i) If μ is EFFN, RM and ANON, then ∀(N , uN ) such that ∀i ∈ N , ui = u,
μi (N , uN , Rl+) = γi , ∀i ∈ N ;
(ii) If μ is EFFN, RM, ANON and SP, then ∀(N , uN ) such that |N | = 2 and γi is
unbounded in every commodity for some i ∈ N , μ j (N , uN , Rl+) = γ j where
j ∈ N and j = i .
The result (i) follows from Remark 1 and the modified Step 1.
For (ii), let (N , uN )which satisfies the required conditions be given. By the modified
Step 1, suppose the contrary that μ j (Rl+) is bounded where j ∈ N and j = i . Thus,
when ω is big enough, agent j would pretend to have agent i’s preference, since his
allocation would be unbounded in every dimension by statement (i) and the assumption
on γi . This contradicts that μ is SP.
Then, the construction of W is basically the same except that u¯ should be chosen
such that its critical set is unbounded in every dimension. By statement (ii), W is well
defined. The rest of the proof is the same. 
unionsq
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